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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DENNIS RAY EDWARDS, A Minor,
by and through his Guardian
Ad Litem, EDWARD EDWARDS,
Plaintiff-Appellant

)
)
)

vs.

)

ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN,

)

Defendant-Respondent

Case No. 15730

)

,
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

.-

Appeal from the First Judicial District
for Box Elder Cotmty, State of Utah,
VeNoy Christofferson, Presiding.

REED M.
MAURICE llIC
2568 Washin
Ogden, Utah
Attorneys
D. GARY CHRISTIAN and
JAMES BLAKESLEY
600 Commercial Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DENNIS

RAY

EDHARDS, a Hiner,

by and through his r.uardian
Ad

Litem, FD'.'ARD EDVJARDS,
Plaintiff-Apnellant

Case No. 15780

vs.
ANN BEARD DIDERICKSEN,
Defendant-Resnondent:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a civil proceeding brought by the Appellant,
Dennis Ray Edwards, a Minor, by and through his Guardian
Ad Litem, Edward Edwards, to recover damages from Defendant-Respondent for injuries inflicted upon his person in
an automobile accident which occurred on the 24th day of.
January, 1976.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOITER COURT
In the District Court of the First Judicial District
in and for Box Elder County, State of Utah, on March 9,
1978, after a jury trial, the defendant was found by an
8-person jury, voting 2 to 6, not to be negligent.

Judgment

was duly entered and recorded against the appellant, no
cause of action, on the 27th day of Harch, 1978.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order of this Court

reversin~

the

judgment rendered at the trial of this case, and a ruling
remanding the case to the trial court for a new trial.
STATEHENT OF FACTS
On January 24, 1976, the Apnellant and his brother,
Danny, left their

parent~'

residence in Honeyville, Utah,

to pick up Danny's girlfriend, Devon Taylor Peters, who
lived near Thatcher in Beix Elder County.

Danny was the

owner and driver of the vehicle at all times relevant to
this case.

The Appellant and Devon were passengers.

After picking up Devon, the three youths proceeded north
on State Route 102, and approximately one and one-half (1-1/2)
miles south of the Thatcher church on State Route 102,
the Edwards vehicle was involved in a collision with
another vehicle driven by the Respondent, Ann Beard
Didericksen, while Respondent was attempting to negotiate
a left turn from the highway into the driveway of her
residence.
Conflicting evidence was presented at the trial as
to the cause of the accident.

The Appellant contended

that the accident was caused by the respondent negligently
making a left turn directly in front of the Appellant's
vehicle.

Respondent contended that the accident was

caused by the negligence of Danny Edwards, the driver of
the vehicle, and by faulty equipment on the Edwards
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vehicle.

All of the evidence was basically presented in

the form of observations by the Appellant, his brother,
the passenger, the Respondent, and two other lay witnesses
who lived in the area.

Only one witness testified at the

trial who thoroughly investigated the accident, performed
tests, took measurements, and evaluated data in an attempt
to determine the cause of the accident.
l~arry

This was Officer

For1sgren of the Utah Highway Patrol, who was quali-

fied by the Appellant, without objection by the Respondent,
as an exrert in accident reconstruction.

Following lengthy

examination by counsel, Forsgren was asked what the cause
of the accident was.

Respondent's counsel objected and

the objection was sustained by the court.

In an in camera

conference, the trial judge was advised by the Apnellant
that the officer's testimony was vital to the Appellant's
case in that it was anticiryated that he would testify
that the Respondent's actions were the proximate cause
of the accident.

The cot;,rt, however, continued to refuse

to allow the testimony.

No other evidence was presented

by the Respondent in an a,ttempt to refute any of the
officer's calculations, but the jury was never allowed
to hear his ultimate conclusion as to the cause of the
accident.

The jury votecl, 6 to 2, that the Respondent

was not negligent, and therefore Appellant had no cause
of action.
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ARGIBIBNT
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO ALLOH INTO EVIDENCE THE
OPINION OF THE INVESTIGATING OFFICE!l AS TO THE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT WAS AN

ABUS;~

OF DISCRETION

A~D

PREJUDICIAL

ERROR.
The Utah rule regarding admissibility of the opinions
of expert witnesses has peen clearly and conclusively set
forth in a number of Utah Supreme Court decisions.

Two

cases decided by the Court in the 1950s are generally
cited as the controlling authority in the area.
1953 casE?, Hooper vs. Gei;i.eral

J~otors

In the

Corporation,

260 P.2d 549, 123 U.515 (1953), a case involving damage
sustained by the plaintiff and plaintiff's automobile
allegedly due to a defective rear tire, the Court stated
the following general rule:
"Oninions as to the cause of a particular
occurrence or accident given by witnesses
possessing peculiar skill or knowledge that is,
experts, are admissible where the subject matter
is not one of common observation or knowledge,
or in other words, where witnesses because of
peculiar knowledge are competent to reach an
intelligent conclusion and inexperienced persons
are likelv to prove incapable of forming a
correct judgment without skilled assistance."
Id. at 552.
In the Hooper case, the Court found that an expert
witness can give his oninion as to causation if he is
properly qualified as an expert, regardless of whether
the opinion goes to the ultimate fact and issue in the
case.
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In Joseph vs. W. H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital
318 P.2d 330, 7 U.2d 39 (1957), the Court considered a
wrongful death action against the LDS Hospital arising from
an allegedly incompatible blood transfusion which created
a kidney infection and caused death.

In considering the

opinion of an expert witness in the case, the Court made
the following observation:
"Phether the t1~stimony of an expert is as to
the very issue before the jurv, is not a proper
test as to its admi.:;sibilit:v. Hhere the subject of
inquiry is in a field beyond the knowledge generally
possessed by laymen, one nroperly qualified therein
l"lay be nermitted to testify to his oninion as an
expert. If the opinion evidence is such that it
will aid the jury ip understanding their prqblems
and lead them to the truth as to disputed issues
of fact, it is comoetent and admissible, irrespective
of ~1hether it bears directly upon the ultimate fact
the jury is to determine." Id. at 334.
Later cases have in:ornorated and reaffirmed standards
set by

He~

and Joseph.

In Stagmeyer vs. Leatham Bros., Inc.,

439 P.2d 279, 20 U.2d 421 (1968), the Court determined
that if an opinion of an exnert is otherwise competent
and admissible, the fact that it bears directly upon the
ultimate fact the jury must determine does not make it any
less admissible.

Id. at 281.

Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Part 2, states:
"If a witness is testifying as an expert,
testil"lonv of the witness in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to such ooinions as the
judge finds are (a) based on facts or data perceived bv or Personally known or made known to
the witness at the hearing; and (b) within the
scope of snecial knowledge, skill, experience or
training possessed by the witness."
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Subpart 4, Pule 56, states:
"Testimony in the form of opinions or inferences
otherwise admissible under these Rules is not
objectionable because it embraces the ultimate
issue or issues to be decided bv the trier of fact."
Thus, both Utah case law and the Rules of Evidence
clearly establish that if an individual is properly qualified as an expert, and if that expert has had the opportunity to personally observe data or physical evidence that
would be difficult, if not impossible, for a layman to
thoroughly understand, then that expert may give his
opinion regarding the ev:ldEmce, and that opinion may be
given even though it emb;rac:es the ultimate issue before
the court or the jury fo;r deteroination.
As noted earlier in the Statement of Facts, the
primary investigation of the collision which is the subject
matter of this action wa@ performed by Officer Larry
Fo:rsg·ren of the Utah Higbway Patrol.
was callE!d as a witness on
this action.

beha~f

(Tr. 139-216.)

Officer Forsgren

of the plaintiff in

Officer ForsRren was ques-

tioned in some detail regarding his experience and his
qualifications as an expert in the field of accident
investigation.

(Tr. 139-141.)

These qualifications and

Officer Forsgren's ability to prooerly investigate and
interpret the physical evidence found at the scene of an
accident were not challenged by Respondent's counsel.
While Officer Forsgren was not personally present at the
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time of the accident, he arrived shortly thereafter and
oerforrned a number of
his investigation.

te~:ts

and measurements as a part of

After exnlaining the various procedures

used to investigate and e,valuate the accident and the
accident scene, Officer Forsgren (Tr. 189) was asked if
he had an opinion as to what was the cause of the accident.
His response was yes.

(Tr. 190)

When asked to give that

opinion to the jury, counsel for Respondent objected to
the answer and the objection was sustained.

The objection

was directed towards Officer Forsgren giving an opinion
0n a matter that went to the ultimate issue and fact in
the case.

In chambers, both counsel argued the point

further, and the judge clearly ruled that it would be
inadmissible in this situation for the Officer to give
his opinion as to the cause of the accident, as it was
the ultimate issue and fact in the case, and therefore
solely the province of the jury.
The Court should take careful note that there was
no issue raised as to whether the tests and procedures
used by the Officer in investigating the accident were
correct or accurate.

Apparently, counsel for the Respond-

ent agreed that the investigation of the accident was
thorough and comprehensive.

There was also no objection

made to Officer Forsgren's qualifications as an expert
in accident reconstruction.

No other expert testimony

was presented concerning the data that was gathered at

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
7
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the time of the accident.

Therefore, the only issue for

decision in this case is whether an exnert witness who
formulates an opinion as to the cause of an accident after
conducting a thorouRh investigation of the situation,
should be allowed to give that opinion to the jury.
The only possible argument against admissibility in
this case in lieu of the great weight of case authority
is whether this is a situation that a layman or a .iuror
would find it difficult to understanding all of the calculations and computations necessary in formulating a
conclusion as to causation.
It is clear that accident investigation is a very
specialized field.

Police officers and highway patrolmen

go through extensive training in order to learn the proper
methods of evaluating stress points, measuring and
evaluating the skid marks, measuring and evaluating points
of impact, and measuring and evaluating contusions and
concussions created on the various cars indicating points
of impact and speed.

These are areas that are difficult for

layrnent to understand, therefore the opinion of an expert
regarding his overall evaluation of all of these items
would be extremely helpful to a jury in arriving at a
decision as to

~ho

was

a1~

fault in an automobile accident.

The court's failure to let the expert witness give
his opinion as to causation in this case was extremely
prejudicial to Appellant's case.

Obviously, the jury
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was divided as to Resoondent's negligence.

It is highly

probable that the expert witness' opinion that Respondent
caused the accident would have resulted in a verdict in
Appellant's favor.

This was the most critical testimony

of Appellant's case and nothing could have been more
prejudicial to Appellant's case than its exclusion.
CONCLUSION
The law in Utah regarding the admissibility of the
opinion of an exoert witness regarding issues that go to
the ultLnate decision that must be made by the jury has
been clearly set forth by case law and by the Utah Rules
of evidence.

In this

ca~e.

Judge Christofferson did not

allow Officer Larry Forsgrem to give his expert opinion
as to the cause of the accident.

'1r. Forsgren was estab-

lished as an expert, his qualifications were outlined
for the jury's consideration, no objection was made to
these qualifications, no attempt was made by Respondent
to out on indenendent experts that disagreed with Officer
Forsgren's findings, no challenge was made as to the
type of tests, analyses, or computations made by Officer
Forsgren.

The only obiection came at the point that

Officer Forsgren was asked to give his opinion as to
the cause of the accident.

Utah law clearly indicates

that an expert, once qualified as an expert, is entitled
to give his oninion in areas where it would be helpful
to the jury to receive such an opinion, even though that
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ooinion may indicate who was ultimately at fault in the
case.
The exclusion of the officer's opinion was clearly
prejudicial to Anoe llant ' s case.
1

The judge connni tted

prejudicial error in not permitting the Officer's opinion
as to causation to be received by the jury.

In light of

the weight of case authority to the contrary, the decision
was a breach of judicial discretion.
For these reasons, Appellant respectfully requests
that the judgment of the court below be reversed and the
case be remanded to the First Judicial District for a
new trial.
Resoectfully submitted,

~f:~lse
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STATE OF UTAH
SS.

COUNTY OF HEBER
Cornes now DONNA CZEKALA, being first duly sworn
upon her oath, and deooses and states that she mailed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Apoellant's Brief
to the following persons
D. GARY Cl!RJ STIAN, ESO. ,
Attornev at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
JAf~S BLAKESLEY, ESO.
Attornev at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 84111

on this 19th day of September, 1978.

.'(:T

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

/if'

day of

September, 1978.

~~);?;&,,
m._;~_,.,.. / -/
y~ _ .> u/~
NOTARY PUBL

Residing at: ,_,_,

Hy

Commission Expires:
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